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INTRODUCTION
More likely than not, you live within seventy-five miles of nuclear
waste.' Perhaps, like many citizens, you were previously unaware of
your proximity to spent nuclear fuel. Or perhaps, if you live in a state
where nuclear waste is a more politically pressing issue-places like
South Carolina, Washington, or Nevada-you are already acquainted
with this peculiar neighbor. Either way, while the safe disposal of nu-
clear waste should be a concern for every citizen, relatively few voices
have dominated the debate over this critical issue during the last few
decades. This may change, however, as public awareness continues to
increase following the severe damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nu-
clear power plant in Japan after a devastating earthquake and tsunami
in March 2011.2 Frightening images of the crippled plant and the
evacuated homes surrounding it have reinvigorated debate in the
United States about the hazards of radioactive waste and the risks of
domestic disaster.3
Although the U.S. government accepted federal responsibility for
disposing of civilian nuclear waste with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
of 1982 (NWPA),4 spent nuclear fuel continues to linger at its source
in temporary storage facilities built by the utility companies operating
nuclear power plants. 5 Some of these facilities are leaking,6 some are
I See Nuclear Energy Student Zone: Facing Challenges, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERcY, http://
www.ne.doe.gov/students/electra-challenges.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) ("[M]ore
than 161 million people reside within 75 miles of temporarily stored nuclear waste.").
2 See, e.g., John M. Glionna, Anxiety in Fukushima's Shadow, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 1, 2011, at
Al; Robert Lee Hotz & Jennifer Levitz, Radiation Detected in U.S., WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2011,
at A12; Hiroko Tabuchi et al., As More Nuclear Plant Damage is Found, Japan Encourages a
Wider Evacuation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2011, at Al1.
3 See, e.g., Chris Kirkham, Nuclear Waste Next Door:Japan Crisis Spotlights America's Radi-
oactive Waste Dilemma, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2011, 8:20 A.M.), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/29/apan-nuclear-waste-dilemma-
america n_841476.html; Roberta Rampton & Ayesha Rascoe, Nuclear Waste Conundrum Tap
Concern for Senators, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/
30/us-usa-nuclear-fuel-idUSTRE72T5U420110330; James Rosen, New House Probe of Obama:
Decision to Dump Yucca Site, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://
www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/01/111420/house-panel-to-probe-obama-on.html.
4 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), Pub. L. No. 97425, 96 Stat. 2201 (1983)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2006)); see Budget Implications of Closing
Yucca Mountain: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 111 th Cong. 43 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Hearing on Budget Implications] (statement of David A. Wright, Vice Chairman, Public
Service Commission of South Carolina).
5 See Hearing on Budget Implications, supra note 4, at 23-24 (statement of Rep. Betty
McCollum, Member, H. Comm. on the Budget).
6 See Dave Gram, Vt. Nuke Fightsfor Future but Chances Are Dimming, ABC NEWS, (Jan. 9,
2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=12576008 (reporting on the uncer-
tain future of the Vermont Yankee nuclear power plant that was discovered to be leaking
tritium near the Connecticut River, and stating that "[t]hirty-seven of the nation's 104
nuclear reactors have had leaks like the ones reported at Vermont Yankee").
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located near elementary schools, 7 and others are already filled to ca-
pacity.8 These problems in "temporary storage" are hardly surprising,
however, since under the NWPA the federal government was to accept
receipt of nuclear waste for permanent disposal in a geologic reposi-
tory in 1998. 9 However, 1998 came and went but nuclear waste stayed
put.
The story of nuclear waste policy in this nation is one fraught with
discord. The legal issues stemming from the government's attempts
to implement the NWPA range from breach of contract and violations
of environmental standards to matters of state sovereignty and separa-
tion of powers. The history of the NWPA offers a particularly rich
array of conflict, but the focus of this Note is on two particular issues:
first, what happened, and second, who has standing to challenge the
current standstill and is best positioned to achieve effective relief. I
argue that settling the standing issue is a crucial first step toward
resolving the legal quagmire that currently defines nuclear waste dis-
posal in the United States.
Part I of this Note presents an overview of the nuclear power in-
dustry by discussing its historical roots and the problem of nuclear
energy by-products, and then delves into Congress's chosen re-
sponse-the NWPA-and the resulting rounds of litigation. Part II
7 See, e.g., Hearing on Budget Implications, supra note 4, at 23 (statement of Rep. Betty
McCollum). Representative McCollum (D-Minn.) explained her concerns regarding the
Prairie Island Indian Community located near her district: "The children of Prairie Island
for over two decades have seen concrete casks of nuclear waste from their swing sets on a
storage site that is owned and operated by Xcel Energy that was designed... to be only a
temporary storage facility. This is unacceptable for human health[ ] and for environmen-
tal hazards in this community like many others across America." Id.
8 See Status of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage at U.S. Commercial Nuclear Plants, NUCLEAR EN-
ERGY INST. (July 2010), http://www.nei.org/resourcesandstats/documentlibrary/nuclear
wastedisposal/factsheet/statusofusednuclearfuelstorage?page= (last visited Nov. 14, 2011)
[hereinafter Status of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage] (providing a list of commercial nuclear
plants accompanied by what year each location will run out of on-site storage space in the
pools that hold used fuel assemblies once they are removed from the reactor and several
power plants ran out of storage space in these pools over two decades ago).
9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101(18) (defining "repository"), 10131(b) (2) (establishing fed-
eral responsibility for high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel), 10222 (a) (5) (B)
(" [B]eginning not later thanJanuary 31, 1998, [the Secretary] will dispose of the high-level
radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel .... ); ROBERT VANDENBOSCH & SUSANNE E. VAN-
DENBOSCH, NUCLEAR WASTE STALEMATE: POLITICAL AND SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES 60
(2007). While a geologic repository may take many forms, in layman's terms, the geologic
repository envisioned by the NWPA is essentially a natural rock storage zone into which
cylindrical containers of radioactive waste will be inserted and buried. Beyond the barriers
provided by the natural environment, there are also engineered protections against the
release of radionuclides into the biosphere. The engineered system is made up of the
waste package (nuclear waste and its surrounding protective container), various auxiliary
components, and the configuration of the repository itself. The natural system is essen-
tially the surrounding rock. As a result, the location and type of which are very important
for creating an effective geologic repository. See DAVID BODANSKY, NUCLEAR ENERGY: PRINCI-
PLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS 266-67 (2d ed. 2004).
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focuses on recent developments related to the proposed repository at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada-specifically, the current administration's
determination to reinterpret, without repealing or amending, provi-
sions of the NWPA as well as the executive, legislative, and judicial
responses that have followed. Part III provides a discussion of modern
standing doctrine with a focus on the place of independent agencies
in the constitutional framework. Finally, Part IV presents an analysis
of who among the spectrum of potential litigants should have stand-
ing to challenge the current halt of progress under the NWPA and
concludes with a recommendation about which petitioner is best posi-
tioned to seek effective redress.
I
A BRIEF HISTORY OF NucLYAR ENERGY
A. The Early Years: Promoting Civilian Nuclear Power Plants
The sixty-five nuclear power plants present in thirty-one states
have historically generated an average of one-fifth of the United
States' electricity supply.10 In 2007, these nuclear power plants gener-
ated over eight hundred billion kilowatt-hours of electric power, more
than nuclear power in Central America, South America, Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East combined."1 While fossil fuels constitute the bulk
of the United States' energy consumption, 12 the nuclear power indus-
try has established a significant presence over the last half-century.' 3
Indeed, the rising demand for energy combined with obstacles to the
expansion of fossil fuel-most notably the OPEC oil embargo in
1973-made nuclear power a viable alternative source of energy. 14
Particularly during these periods of shortage, atomic energy appeared
to many to be an ideal solution.15 Despite the advantages of nuclear
power, however, both its history and its future are controversial.
First, in the years following World War II, memories of Hiroshima
and the catastrophic damage that nuclear weapons can cause re-
10 What is the Status of the U.S. Nuclear Industry? U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 22,
2011), http://www.eia.doe.gov/energy_in brief/nuclearindustry.cfm.
11 Table 27: World Net Nuclear Electric Power Generation, 1980-2006, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/iea/elec.html (click on "World Net Nuclear Electric Power
Generation (Billion Kilowatthours), 1980-2006") (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
12 See ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2010, OFFICE OF ENERGY STATISTICS, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. 5 tbl. 1.1 (2011), available at h ttp://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/pdf/
aer.pdf.
13 See id.
14 See BODANSKY, supra note 9, at 18-21 (discussing shifting attitudes about the status
of nuclear energy in the United States, which peaked in popularity during the 1970s).
15 See id. at 20 ("[N]uclear energy was favored by an almost romantic image of it as a
source of abundant, clean energy, by the possible technological imperative to move ahead
because it was possible to do so, and by the correct, even if not well quantified, recognition
of an eventual limit to fossil fuels.").
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mained fresh in the minds of many Americans. 16 Unfortunately, these
images of atomic devastation from Japan had no positive mitigating
counterpart in the public consciousness because the government
shielded its applications of nuclear power behind a veil of national
security. 17 As a result, public understanding of nuclear power has
been incomplete from the beginning, and concerns about safety and
the threat of improper use have dominated (and continue to domi-
nate) the national discourse. Many individuals involved with the nu-
clear industry have suggested that public concern is overblown,' 8 but
it is hardly surprising that laymen confronting the concept of nuclear
fission experience discomfort. This is especially true today, when the
public is once again faced with horrors wrought by nuclear disaster in
Japan' 9 accompanied by continued confusion and anxiety over the
precise dangers posed by radiation.2 0
In spite of public disquiet in the wake of World War II, the bud-
ding nuclear industry was optimistic about the future of nuclear
power generation.2 1 In 1946, Congress created the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) to both promote and regulate the nuclear incus-
try.22 By the mid-1970s, however, public distrust of the agency's dual
16 See id. ("[B]enign nuclear power had a malign older sibling in nuclear weapons.");
see also VANDENBOSCH & VANDENBOSCH, supra note 9, at 3 (discussing public fear of
radiation).
17 See Eugene A. Rosa & William R. Freudenburg, The Historical Development of Public
Reactions to Nuclear Power: Implications for Nuclear Waste Policy, in PUBLIC REACTIONS TO Nu-
CLEAR WASTE: CITIZENS' VIEWS OF REPOSITORY SITING 32, 33 (Riley E. Dunlap et al. eds.,
1993) (noting that national security interests protected the "nuclear subgovernment" from
obligations of public disclosure under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946); see also Howard
Morland, Born Secret, 26 CAxDozo L. REv. 1401, 1401-08 (2005) (discussing the "born se-
cret" provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which effectively created a "permanent
gag order affecting all public discussion of an entire subject matter").
18 See BODANSKY, supra note 9, at 22; see also PUBLIC REACTIONS TO NUCLEAR WASTE:
CITIZENS' VIEWS OF REPOSITORY SITING, supra note 17 (collecting essays on various public
responses to radioactive waste).
19 See sources cited supra note 2.
20 See, e.g., Gloria Goodale, Nuclear Radiation in Pop Culture: More Giant Lizards Than
Real Science, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
2011/0330/Nuclear-radiation-in-pop-culture-more-giant-lizards-than-real-science (discuss-
ing the entertainment industry's use of the public fear about radiation); Carolyn Y. John-
son, Crisis in Japan Raises Fears in U.S.: Worries About Radiation Ingrained Since Hiroshima,
BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 29, 2011), http://articles.boston.com/2011-03-29/lifestyle/
29360843 1_radiation-exposure-radioactive-iodine-massachusetts-rainwater (reporting on
public anxiety over radiation risks).
21 See BODANSKY, supra note 9, at 31-33. The industry was perhaps too optimistic at
times, however, since expectations have not, for the most part, lived up to the enthusiasm
of the post-World War II years.
22 See Act of Aug. 1, 1946, ch. 724, § 2(a), 60 Stat. 755, 756; see also Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206-07 (1983) (dis-
cussing the early history of atomic energy in the United States); VANDENBOSCH & VANDEN-
BOSCH, supra note 9, at 35 (discussing the Atomic Energy Commission and its successor
agencies' responsibility concerning the disposal of radioactive waste).
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(and potentially conflicting) missions spurred Congress to abolish the
AEC in favor of assigning its regulatory activities to the newly created
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the remainder of its re-
sponsibilities to the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion (ERDA).23 Shortly after its creation, the ERDA merged with
several other agencies to become the present-day Department of En-
ergy (DOE).24
From its inception, nuclear power has been uniquely positioned
as the "only energy source that began as, and remains, a primarily
public enterprise. '25 Of course, while nuclear power plants in the
United States are technically civilian-run, government assistance has
been instrumental. Initially, the federal government funded all of the
original research and development, provided free uranium fuel, and
restricted nuclear power plants' liability in case of accident under the
Price-Anderson Act.26 Even today, federal loan guarantees are instru-
mental in plans for expanding nuclear power. 27 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, the federal government took responsibility for researching
methods of nuclear waste disposal, and eventually, for disposing of all
civilian radioactive waste. 28
During the nuclear power industry's first several decades, true
concern over nuclear waste management did not penetrate industry
culture.29 While it has become clear that radioactive waste poses a
23 See Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5811 (establishing the Energy
Research and Development Administration), 5814 (abolishing the AEC), 5841 (a) (1) (es-
tablishing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 5841 (f) (transferring the "licens-
ing and related regulatory functions of the Atomic Energy Commission" to the NRC)
(2006); see also VANDENBOSCH & VANDENBOSCH, supra note 9, at 35 (discussing the abolish-
ment of the AEC and establishment of two new agencies in its place); Rosa & Freudenburg,
supra note 17, at 35-38 (discussing the AEC's lax safety standards for the nuclear industry
and its emphasis on industry self-regulation).
24 See MARC ALLEN EISNER ET AL., CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY POLICY 274-77 (2d ed.
2006) (discussing President Nixon's failed proposal to create a cabinet-level Department of
Energy and Natural Resources in 1974 and President Carter's subsequent success in 1977).
25 Id. at 270.
26 42 U.S.C. § 2210; see EISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 270 (listing government contri-
butions to the nuclear power industry and concluding that "it is extraordinarily unlikely
that civilian nuclear power would exist without government support").
27 See Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Backs Construction of Reactors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, at
BI (reporting President Obama's announcement of an $8.3 billion federal loan guarantee
to assist utility companies building twin nuclear reactors in Georgia).
28 See EISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 270.
29 See Rosa & Freudenburg, supra note 17, at 33-34 (arguing that nuclear waste was
viewed as a minute issue both during World War II-due to more pressing concerns and
the minimal amount of waste generated at the time-and also in subsequent years when
"techno-optimism" pervaded the industry); see also BODANSKY, supra note 9, at 254 ("For
many years, the United States 'nuclear establishment' felt no urgency about the waste dis-
posal problem because it appeared to be easily solvable and not technically interesting.");
Michael E. Kraft et al., Public Opinion and Nuclear Waste Policymaking, in PUBLIC REACTIONS
TO NUCLEAR WASTE: CITIZENS' VIEWS OF REPOSITORY SITING, supra note 17, at 3, 7 (stating
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significant problem for the nuclear industry, even today, opinion is
divided over whether the difficulty stems from technical deficiency or
simply from flawed perception.30 Of course, fear of radioactive waste
is not without basis in fact. The transuranic elements and the short-
and long-lived fission products present in nuclear waste emit alpha,
beta, and gamma radiation, as well as neutrons.3' Significant or pro-
longed exposure to ionizing radiation will result in biological damage
that increases the likelihood of the exposed individual developing
cancer.3 2 Thus, one thing everyone can agree on is that radioactive
waste must be disposed of safely and permanently.
B. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
Numerous approaches to the problem of nuclear waste disposal
have been studied and implemented around the world .3 3 In the
United States, federal agencies began to officially address the need for
a comprehensive waste management scheme in the 1970s when the
popularity of nuclear power was at its zenith.34 Yet by the latter half of
the decade, concerns about the continued use and expansion of nu-
clear power emerged on several different fronts. First, upon arriving
in office in 1977, PresidentJimmy Carter made energy policy a central
objective of his administration.3 5 Second, and perhaps most funda-
that neither the federal government nor the nuclear industry was particularly troubled by
the feasibility of waste disposal until the 1970s).
30 See BODANSKY, supra note 9, at 337-38 (identifying two polar stances on the prob-
lem of nuclear waste disposal).
31 See id. at 57-58, 146-47, 619.
32 See id. at 57-63, 87-88 (giving an overview of the problems associated with radia-
tion exposure and explaining that the long-term effect of exposure at low doses of radia-
tion "is an increased risk of cancer," while exposure at high doses of radiation is usually
fatal).
33 See id. at 253-87. David Bodansky offers an informative presentation of various
methods of radioactive waste disposal, including storage of spent fuel at reactor sites, in-
terim storage at centralized facilities, deep geologic disposal and variants thereof, sub-
seabed disposal, partitioning and transmutation of radionuclides, extraterrestrial disposal
with rockets, and polar disposal. Bodansky also discusses the plans currently in use or
expected to be implemented in various countries around the world. See id. at 285-86; see
generally NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION AND DEV., PARTNERING
FOR LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE: EVOLUTION AND CURRENT PRACTICE
IN THIRTEEN COUNTRIES (2010) (discussing the waste disposal approaches taken by various
nations).
34 See Leroy C. Gould, The Radioactive Waste Management Problem, in Too HOT TO HAN-
DLE?: SOCIAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES 1, 4-7
(Charles A. Walker et al. eds., 1983) (detailing early steps in the process towald developing
and implementing a national plan for the disposal of radioactive waste).
35 See EISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 276 (discussing President Carter's objectives for
energy policy). Although (or perhaps because) Carter had a background in nuclear engi-
neering, he intended to reduce the nation's reliance on nuclear power. His determination
likely stemmed from fear that expanding nuclear technology could cause both environ-
mental and national security risks because of the increasing availability of radioactive mate-
rial. See id. at 279-80; see also Thomas A. Cotton, Nuclear Waste Story: Setting the Stage, in
2012] 665
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mental for spurring change, on March 29, 1979 the partial core
meltdown at Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station in Penn-
sylvania effectively sounded a nationwide alarm of the dangers of radi-
oactive waste contamination. 36  Following the accident, public
approval of the nuclear power industry dropped precipitously. 37 The
stage was set for the federal government to demonstrate control of the
civilian nuclear power industry by developing a plan for disposing of
the radioactive waste increasingly feared by the public.
Each branch of the government played its own key role in shap-
ing the course of action. Interestingly, an arm of the judiciary took
one of the first steps. Less than two months after the accident at
Three Mile Island, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia issued a decision effectively rebuking the NRC for extending
nuclear power plant licenses without a plan for handling radioactive
waste. 38 In Minnesota v. NRC, the D.C. Circuit remanded two licensing
actions to the NRC for further review in conjunction with the agency's
ongoing investigation (begun in 1972) of nuclear waste disposal op-
tions.39 By late October 1979, the NRC had issued a Notice of Pro-
posed Rulemaking "in response to the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals in State of Minnesota v. NRC' and in "continuation of
previous proceedings" concerning permanent disposal of nuclear
waste.
40
In its position statement regarding the proposed rulemaking, the
DOE affirmed its commitment to President Carter's message to Con-
gress, in which he stated his intention to "adopt[ ] an interim plan-
ning strategy focused on the use of mined geologic repositories
capable of accepting both waste from reprocessing and unreprocessed
UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE NATION'S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR
WASTE 29, 31-32 (Allison M. Macfarlane & Rodney C. Ewing eds., 2006) (outlining the
national policy discussion that ensued after President Carter established the Interagency
Review Group on Nuclear Management in 1978).
36 See, e.g., Thomas O'Toole, Radiation Spreads 10 Miles From A-Plant Mishap Site, WASH.
POST, Mar. 29, 1979, at Al.
37 See Rosa & Freudenburg, supra note 17, at 47-48 (noting that polls prior to the
accident at Three Mile Island showed that supporters of growth in the nuclear power in-
dustry outnumbered opponents approximately two-to-one, but that following March 1979,
the figure shifted to closer to one-to-one); cf BODANSKV, supra note 9, at 419-20 (discussing
studies of the health effects of the Three Mile Island accident and concluding that "there is
virtually no possibility that there have been or will be observable health effects from radio-
activity released in the [Three Mile Island] accident").
38 602 F.2d 412, 416, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
39 Id. at 416 ("We agree with the Commission's position that it could properly con-
sider the complex issue of nuclear waste disposal in a 'generic' proceeding such as
rulemaking, and then apply its determinations in subsequent adjudicatory proceedings.").
40 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Storage and Disposal of Nuclear Waste, 44
Fed. Reg. 61372, 61373 (Oct. 25, 1979).
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commercial spent fuel."41 Despite this show of executive will and ad-
ministrative support, by 1982 the United States had a thriving com-
mercial nuclear power sector and a new president who supported its
expansion, but still no accepted plan for the disposal of radioactive
waste-a plan that would prove necessary to grow or even maintain
the bulky industry.4 2 Finally, Congress 'joined the fray" and took deci-
sive action by passing the NWPA, which officially established federal
responsibility for the permanent disposal of all civilian radioactive
waste in a deep geologic repository. 43
Although Congress recognized that the federal government "has
the responsibility to provide for the permanent disposal of high-level
radioactive waste and. . spent nuclear fuel," the NWPA allocates the
cost of financing a repository to the civilian nuclear waste industry.44
Under section 10222(a) of the NWPA, Congress took the unique step
of authorizing the Secretary of Energy to enter into Standard Con-
tracts with nuclear power plant owners that levied a fee of one-tenth
of one cent (one mil) per kilowatt-hour on electricity generated by
civil nuclear power reactors. 45 Owners pay the fees into the Nuclear
Waste Fund, which Congress created to finance the development and
construction of a deep geologic repository. 46 In return for funding
the government's radioactive waste disposal activities, the DOE was
obligated to the contracting parties to take title to civilian-generated
radioactive waste as soon as a repository commenced operation and to
dispose of said waste not later than January 31, 1998. 4 7
With this deadline in mind, the NWPA set forth an aggressive
schedule for the site selection, licensing, construction, and operation
of a geologic repository to permanently store civilian generated radio-
active waste. 48 Pursuant to the NWPA, the first step fell to the DOE to
promulgate guidelines for recommending candidate sites. 49 In 1983,
41 DEP'T OF ENERGY, DOE/NE-0007, STATEMENT OF POSITION OF THE DEP'T OF ENERGY
IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF NUCLEAR
WASTE (WASTE CONFIDENCE RULEMAKING) (1980), at 1-6.
42 See EISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 281-83 (discussing policy changes made under
President Reagan that promoted commercial nuclear power by increasing appropriations,
relaxing standards for licensing, prohibiting state and local governments from delaying
new power plants, and doubling the licensing period for all nuclear power plants).
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101 (18), 10131(b)(1)-(2) (2006); EISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at
283.
44 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (a) (4)-(5); see also id. § 10222 (establishing and describing the
"Nuclear Waste Fund").
45 Id. § 10222(a)(1)-(2).
46 See id. § 10222(c)-(d).
47 Id. § 10222(a) (5).
48 Id. § 10131(b)(1).
49 Id. § 10132(a) (providing a variety of factors for the Secretary to consider in devel-
oping guidelines, including proximity to valuable natural resources, water supplies, popu-
lations, components of the National Park System, as well as nearness to sites where nuclear
waste is already temporarily stored).
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the DOE nominated nine candidate sites and, by 1984, the DOE had
produced draft environmental assessments for each.50 Subsequently
(though already over a year behind schedule), the DOE narrowed the
list to three recommended locations for further site characterization:
Hanford in Washington, Deaf Smith County in Texas, and Yucca
Mountain in Nevada.51 Out of frustration with lengthening delays,
protectionist political maneuvering, or some combination thereof,
however, Congress intervened and passed the Nuclear Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA), designating Yucca Mountain in
Nevada as the sole site for characterization. 52
C. Litigation
1. Nevada
The decision to focus exclusively on Yucca Mountain may have
made economic and even technical sense for the nation as a whole, 53
but the reaction from the citizens of Nevada was less than apprecia-
tive, epitomized by the local name for the NWPAA: the "[S] crew Ne-
vada [B] ill. ' '54 The state of Nevada has fought against the plan to turn
Yucca Mountain into the nation's nuclear waste repository for over
two decades. 55 Indeed, since the 1987 site selection, Nevada has done
everything conceivable to impede government progress toward devel-
oping Yucca Mountain. For example, in 1989, the state legislature
50 See Availability of Draft Environmental Assessments for Proposed Site Nominations
and Announcement of Public Information Meetings and Hearings, 49 Fed. Reg. 49,540
(Dec. 20, 1984); see also VANDENBOSCH & VANDENBOSCH, supra note 9, at 61 (discussing the
DOE's timeline immediately following passage of the NWPA). Note that Section
10132(b) (1) (A) of the NWPA required the Secretary to propose at least five sites "that he
determines suitable for site characterization for selection of the first repository site." 42
U.S.C. § 101(b)(1) (A).
51 Cotton, supra note 35, at 35. Although the NWPA required the recommendation
to occur by January 1, 1985, the Secretary's environmental assessment of these three sites
was not completed until May of 1986. See 42 U.S.C. § 101 (b) (1) (A)-(B). The selected sites
were unique from one another both in location and geologic makeup: a basalt site in
Washington, a bedded salt site in Texas, and a tuff site in Nevada. See BODANSKY, supra note
9, at 297.
52 See Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 5011 (a), 101 Stat. 1330-228 (1987) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 10172(a)). SeeEISNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 285 (discussing the "not in my
backyard" (NIMBY) syndrome that infected Congress regarding site selection and noting
that "[iut was probably no coincidence that of the three states mentioned as possible sites,
Texas and Washington managed to get themselves removed from the list while members of
their congressional delegations served as Speaker and majority leader of the House").
53 See Cotton, supra note 35, at 36 (rationalizing the decision to limit evaluation to
Yucca Mountain as a reasonable focusing of resources but also indicating that Nevadans
resented the development as "purely political").
54 Thomas W. Lippman, Nevada's Objections Stall Plan for Nuclear Waste Repository: Alter-
native Sites Lacking as Setbacks Mount, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1989, at Al.
55 In Nevada ex rel. Loux v. Herrington, 777 F.2d 529, 536 (9th Cir. 1985), at the begin-
ning of this fight, Nevada had a brief taste of success after the Ninth Circuit held that,
under the NWPA, Nevada was entitled to funding for pre-site characterization activities.
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sent a clear signal of its resolve by passing a bill declaring it "unlawful
for any person or governmental entity to store high-level radioactive
waste in Nevada."56 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
had little difficulty resisting Nevada's state sovereignty arguments and
striking down the legislation.5 7 After this failed statutory attempt, Ne-
vada focused its efforts on judicial intervention, most recently arguing
against the DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement for the
transport of nuclear fuel to Yucca Mountain.5 8 Despite Nevada's
ongoing efforts, victory has proved elusive. Still, the extensive delays
resulting from Nevada's relentless litigation represent a measured
form of success for the state.5
9
2. Utility Companies
Indeed, the plausible timeframe for developing Yucca Mountain
has slowed with each passing year. Following the passage of the
NWPAA in 1987, the DOE began the complex and time-consuming
process of site characterization. By 1989, it was apparent that the
DOE would not complete this undertaking on schedule to dispose of
radioactive waste by 1998 as required by the NWPA-authorized con-
tracts with the nuclear industry.60 Not surprisingly, on top of its court-
room battles with Nevada, the DOE has faced repeated contractual
challenges from nuclear power plants. Issues arose when it became
apparent that a repository would not be started-let alone com-
pleted-by the deadline the NWPA established for the DOE to accept
nuclear waste. 61 Litigation ensued after the DOE published a Notice
of Inquiry on the Waste Acceptance Issues in 1994, in which the
agency took the preliminary position that it did not have an obligation
56 NEV. REV. STAT. § 459.910 (2010).
57 The Ninth Circuit invalidated this legislation in Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545
(9th Cir. 1990), in which the state advanced a bevy of arguments to prevent the DOE from
continuing with site characterization at Yucca Mountain. After rejecting each of Nevada's
arguments, the court held that the NWPA preempted Nevada's state legislation because of
Congress's clear intent for the DOE to continue with site characterization. Id. at 1561.
58 See Nevada v. Dep't of Energy, 457 F.3d 78, 93-94 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (denying Ne-
vada's petition for review of the DOE's Final Environmental Impact Statement and Record
of Decision regarding the transportation of nuclear waste from utility companies to Yucca
Mountain).
59 For a concise outline of the major litigation, see Annemarie Wall, Going Nowhere in
the Nuke of Time: Breach of the Yucca Contract, Nuclear Waste Policy Act Fallout and Shelter in
Private Interim Storage, 12 ALB. ENVrL. OUTLOOKJ. 138 (2007).
60 Cotton, supra note 35, at 37 (stating that by 1989 the DOE had adjusted its estimate
of the date a working repository would be available to 2010); see infra Part II for a discus-
sion of the litigation that ensued following the government's failure to meet the 1998
deadline for accepting nuclear waste.
61 See Notice of Inquiry on Waste Acceptance Issues, 59 Fed. Reg. 27007, 27008 (May
25, 1994) (projecting 2010 as the earliest possible date for a completed repository).
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to accept nuclear waste by the 1998 deadline in the absence of an
operational repository.62
The nuclear utilities achieved their first major victory in 1996,
when the D.C. Circuit held that, under the NWPA, the Secretary of
Energy had an obligation to begin accepting nuclear waste in 1998
despite the unavailability of a geologic repository; since the DOE had
not yet breached the contract however, the court deemed it prema-
ture to determine an appropriate remedy. 63 When the DOE main-
tained its position that the agency had no duty to accept nuclear waste
by the statutory deadline, utility companies responded by seeking a
writ of mandamus directing the DOE to comply with its obligations
under the NWPA.64 The court handed the petitioners a partial vic-
tory, holding that while the DOE had an "unconditional obligation" to
begin accepting spent nuclear fuel by 1998, the utility companies must
follow the remedial scheme provided by the Standard Contract.65 In
addition, the court determined that the DOE was precluded from ar-
guing "unavoidable" delay on the grounds that the agency had not yet
prepared a functioning repository.66
This pronouncement proved key in subsequent companion cases
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on August 31,
2000.67 The court determined that the potential administrative relief
available under the contract "would fall far short of the relief neces-
sary adequately to compensate" the utility companies. 68 As a result,
the court authorized the utility company-petitioners to pursue judicial
relief in the United States Court of Federal Claims for damages stem-
ming from the DOE's breach of contract.69 At present, nuclear power
companies have filed seventy-two cases against the DOE in the Court
of Federal Claims. 70
62 See id.
63 See Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(vacating the DOE's Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues).
64 See N. States Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy (Northern States 1), 128 F.3d 754, 754
(D.C. Cir. 1997).
65 Id. at 760-61.
66 Id. at 761 ("We therefore issue a writ of mandamus precluding DOE from excusing
its own delay on the grounds that it has not yet prepared a permanent repository or in-
terim storage facility.").
67 Me. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N.
States Power Co. v. United States (Northern States 11), 224 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
68 Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d at 1342 (holding that since there was no dispute that the
DOE had not begun accepting waste as mandated, the DOE had breached the contract
and "complete relief" would not be available under the limited provisions of the contract).
69 See id.; see also Northern States II, 224 F.3d at 1367 ("In brief, we hold that the una-
voidable delays provision deals with delays arising after performance of the contract has
begun, and does not bar a suit seeking damages for the government's failure to begin
performance at all by the statutory and contractual deadline of January 31, 1998.").
70 See CIVIL Drv., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GENERAL LEGAL ACrrvITIES: FY 2011 BUDGET
REQUEST AT A GLANCE 2, available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/201 lsummary/pdf/fyI 1-
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3. Uncertainty over Regulatory Standards
Along with countless rounds of litigation concerning state sover-
eignty and contract liability, the DOE faced another hurdle in the
courtroom: uncertainty over the proper regulatory standards to mea-
sure future effects of stored radioactive waste. Under the NWPA, the
task of setting standards to reduce the risk of environmental harm
from radioactive waste release fell to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).71 In 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act, di-
recting the EPA to set site-specific standards for Yucca Mountain con-
sistent with recommendations by the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS).72 The standards set forth by the EPA provided a ten thousand-
year scope for the safety of stored nuclear waste-however, according
to the NAS, the relevant time scale for assessing future effects of nu-
clear waste is closer to one million years. 73 Accordingly, the D.C. Cir-
cuit vacated the EPA's promulgated standard,74 which forced further
scientific inquiry and evaluation on the already lengthy site characteri-
zation process.
Finally, with all of the requisite constraints more or less in order,
fifteen years after Congress passed the NWPAA, the DOE officially rec-
ommended Yucca Mountain to the President as an appropriate site
for the development of a repository.75 As required by the NWPA, the
DOE also notified the governor and legislature of Nevada regarding
the decision. 76 President George W. Bush submitted his recommen-
dation for approval of the site to Congress one day after the Secretary
of Energy's recommendation.7 7 As expected, the state of Nevada ex-
ercised its right under the NWPA to submit a notice of disapproval to
civ-bud-summary.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011) (discussing spent nuclear fuel litigation
costs).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 10141(a) (2006).
72 Pub. L. 102-486, § 801 (a)(1), 102 Stat. 2776, 2921 (1992) (codified as note to 42
U.S.C. § 10141) ("[T]he Administrator shall, based upon and consistent with the findings
and recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences, promulgate, by rule, public
health and safety standards for protection of the public from releases from radioactive
materials stored or disposed of in the repository at the Yucca Mountain site.").
73 Nuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
74 Id. at 1273.
75 RECOMMENDATION BY THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY REGARDING THE SUITABILITY OF THE
YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE FOR A REPOSITORY UNDER THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982
(Feb. 2002), available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-energy/is-
sues/yucca-mountain/secretary-of-energy-recommendation sar ocrwmdoe.gov.pdf; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 10 1 3 4 (a)(1); Cotton, supra note 35, at 38.
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 10134(a) (1); Cotton, supra note 35, at 38.
77 See Cotton, supra note 35, at 38. The NWPA, 42 U.S.C. 10134(a)(2)(A), required
this action.
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Congress.78 Congress voted to overrule Nevada and officially approve
Yucca Mountain as the site of the planned repository.7 9
II
YUCCA MOUNTAIN: No LONGER A WORKABLE OPTION
The development of a permanent repository may not have been
advancing at a timely pace, but the agencies involved continued to
make steady progress following the official approval of Yucca Moun-
tain in 2002. After six additional years of preparation, the DOE sub-
mitted its 8,600-page license application for Yucca Mountain to the
NRC on June 3, 2008.80 During the press conference announcing the
submission, the Secretary of Energy cited the twenty years of work that
went into preparing the application and stated that he was "confident
that the NRC's rigorous review process will validate that the Yucca
Mountain repository will provide for the safe disposal of spent nuclear
fuel and high-level radioactive waste.""' While the NWPA allocates
three years for the NRC to review the license application and issue a
final decision approving or disapproving construction authorization,8 2
less than two years after submitting the application, on March 3, 2010,
the DOE filed a motion with the NRC seeking to withdraw the license
application with prejudice, providing yet another twist along the un-
predictable path to Yucca Mountain.83
A. Shifting Priorities
So what changed between 2008 and 2010? Although the DOE's
reversal of its position on Yucca Mountain may seem like a sudden
kink in the story, there had been warning signs that a sea change was
under way. To fully understand this turn of events, however, it is nec-
78 See 42 U.S.C. § 10135(b); VANDENBOSCH & VANDENBOSCH, supra note 9, at 44-45.
79 See VANDENBOSCH & VANDENBOSCH, supra note 9, at 45 (commenting that post-Sep-
tember 11, 2001 concerns about the possibility of future terrorist attacks on temporary
storage facilities housing nuclear waste around the nation contributed to the debate in
favor of approving the Yucca Mountain site). Congress acted pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 10135(c).
80 The DOE's license application and other related key documents are on the NRC's
website: http://www.nrc.gov/waste/hlw-disposal/yucca-lic-app.html.
81 Press Release, Sec. of Energy Samuel W. Bodman, Yucca Mountain Press Confer-
ence (June 3, 2008), http://www.id.doe.gov/news/PressReleases/PRO80603-YuccaSam/
YuccaMountainPressConference.pdf. The Secretary emphasized the importance of devel-
oping a responsible means of dealing with nuclear waste in order to make nuclear energy
the option that it needs to be for the nation's future energy use: "In order to ensure that
such an expansion can occur, the United States simply must have a permanent repository
.... This [nuclear waste] material is directed to go to Yucca Mountain by law .... Id.
82 See 42 U.S.C. § 10134(d).
83 U.S. Department of Energy's Motion to Withdraw, U.S. Dep't of Energy (High-
Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001-HLW (A.S.L.B.P. Mar. 3, 2010) [hereinafter DOE Mo-
tion to Withdraw].
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essary to explore a particularly dark and unwieldy aspect of American
government: politics. On the very same day that the DOE submitted
the license application to the NRC, Barack Obama secured the Demo-
cratic nomination to run for President in 2008.84 The Democratic pri-
mary campaign was hard-fought, and amidst the several states with
early primary elections the Nevada caucus stands out as having been
particularly contentious. The state secured an early voting slot in
large part due to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nevada), a
key voice in the national political sphere and the Democratic Party. 85
Like Senator Reid (or perhaps because of Senator Reid), whose inde-
fatigable opposition to Yucca Mountain is well known,86 all of the
Democratic candidates were united in their opposition to Yucca
Mountain. 87  Indeed, during his campaign, Obama specifically
pledged that he would "end the notion of Yucca Mountain." 88
After his successful 2008 general-election campaign, now-Presi-
dent Obama began to follow through with that promise. The appoint-
ment power is a particularly useful tool for political and administrative
control, and the President used it decisively, first by nominating a new
Secretary of Energy, 89 and then, in May of 2009, by appointing a for-
mer aide to Senator Reid to be the chairman of the NRC.90 The views
of other nominees to the NRC were similarly vetted. On behalf of
Senator Reid, during the Senate hearings it was explicitly confirmed
with each of three prospective nominees (all of whom were subse-
quently appointed) that they would support the decision to cease re-
view of the Yucca Mountain license application. 91
84 Adam Zoll & Steve Layton, A Historic Race: How the Nomination Was Won, CHI. TmuB.,
June 4, 2008, at 6.
85 See Mark Z. Barabak & Seema Mehta, In Nevada, Democrats Duel to the Bitter End, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, at A14; see also Shailagh Murray & Chris Cillizza, The Sunday Fix: Demo-
cratic Clout Brings Early Caucus to Nevada, WASH. PosT, Nov. 4, 2007, at A2.
86 Senator Reid has been attempting to obstruct legislation designed to further the
development of Yucca Mountain for over two decades. Through various measures, includ-
ing numerous threatened filibusters and planned "holds" on bills, Senator Reid has made
his position eminently clear. In 1987, he did not have enough political power to prevent
the NWPAA designation of Yucca Mountain as the sole site for a national nuclear waste
repository, but later in his career, and now as the Senate Majority Leader, his voice has
become significantly louder. See VANDENBOSCH & VANDENBOSCH, supra note 9, at 90-93.
87 See Murray & Cillizza, supra note 85 ("One issue in Nevada is settled: All the Demo-
crats oppose dumping nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain."); see also Barabak & Mehta, supra
note 85 (identifying Yucca Mountain as an "easy" national issue for Democrats).
88 Editorial, 'Where Does It All Go?, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 2008, at A26.
89 See id. (noting that Secretary of Energy Steven Chu is "unenthusiastic" about Yucca
Mountain).
90 See Mary Manning, Obama Names Ex-Reid Aide to Lead Nuclear Commission, LAs VEGAS
SUN, May 13, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/may/13/former-reid-aide-
likely-lead-nuclear-commission/.
91 Nominations Hearing of the S. Env't and Pub. Works Comm., 111th Cong. 13-15 (2010),
(statements of Sen. Barbara Boxer, Chairman, S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works; and
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The most public rebuke to the plan for a repository at Yucca
Mountain came on January 29, 2010, when the administration di-
rected the Secretary of Energy to establish a Blue Ribbon Commission
on America's Nuclear Future to review and evaluate policies for man-
aging nuclear waste, including any "technological and policy alterna-
tives."92 The President attributed the need for the Blue Ribbon
Commission to the fact that "the Nation's approach, developed more
than 20 years ago, to managing materials derived from nuclear activi-
ties, including nuclear fuel and nuclear waste, has not proven effec-
tive." 93 Accordingly, the proposed executive budget for fiscal year
2011 affirmatively stated that: "The Administration has determined
that Yucca Mountain, Nevada, is not a workable option for a nuclear
waste repository ... . "-94 Reflecting this stance, the money appropri-
ated to the DOE for radioactive waste management fell from $288 mil-
lion in 2009 to an estimated $197 million in 2010, to a total absence of
funding projected for 2011.95 The DOE dealt the final blow in March
2010, when it submitted its motion to withdraw the pending license
application for the Yucca Mountain repository.
B. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Initial Decision
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (ASLBP), an inde-
pendent trial-level adjudicatory body within the NRC, had the task of
ruling on the DOE's motion to withdraw.96 In its motion to withdraw,
the DOE essentially argued that although the NWPA did require the
William D. Magwood IV, George Apostolakis, and William Charles Ostendorff, nominees to
be members of the NRC). At one point, the dialogue proceeded as follows:
Sen. Boxer: "Now I have a question here for all three of you from Senator
Reid and you could just answer it 'yes' or 'no.' If confirmed, would you
second-guess the Department of Energy's decision to withdraw the license
application for Yucca Mountain from NRC'S review?"
Mr. Magwood: "No."
Sen. Boxer: "Okay. Anybody else?"
Mr. Apostolakis: "No."
Mr. Ostendorff: "No."
Sen. Boxer: "Thank you. I think he'll be very pleased with that."
92 See Memorandum on the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future
2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. Doc. 20100063 (Jan. 29, 2010) [hereinafter Presidential Memoran-
dum], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPD-201000063.pdf.
93 See id.
94 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2011
71 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fyll/pdf/budget.pdf
95 See id.
96 ASLPB decisions are subject to review by the full Commission. ASLBP Responsibili-
ties, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/adju-
dicatory/aslbp-respons.html (last updated Aug. 5, 2011). The three administrative judges
who ruled on the DOE's motion are Thomas S. Moore (Chairman), Paul S. Ryerson, and
Richard E. Wardwell. For biographical information, see Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
Panel Members, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organi-
zation/panel-members.htmlor (last updated Sept. 26, 2011).
[Vol. 97:659
STANDING IN NUCLEAR WASTE
Secretary of Energy to submit the application to the NRC, there was
no limitation on the Secretary's ability to subsequently withdraw the
application. 97 Moreover, the DOE contended that under the NRC's
license governing regulations (which applied to this application), the
agency could grant withdrawal on whatever terms it desired, that is,
with prejudice.98 The DOE supplemented these contentions with re-
peated references to policy decisions, the public interest, and defer-
ence to both the agency's interpretation of the NWPA and the
executive resolve to pursue alternatives to Yucca Mountain.99
Despite the DOE's none-too-subtle efforts to remind the ASLBP
of its proper place in the grand scheme of executive decision mak-
ing-which, based on the DOE's motion, involves nothing more than
deference to the policy judgments of more qualified parties-the
ASLBP delivered a resounding denial of the DOE's motion to with-
draw.10 The ASLBP first addressed whether the DOE had the author-
ity to withdraw the application under the NWPA, quickly concluding
that "[u]nless Congress directs otherwise, DOE may not single-
handedly derail the legislated decision-making process by withdrawing
the Application."1 1 The decision focused heavily on the DOE's "illog-
ical" theory that the executive is the sole authority responsible for de-
termining whether or not following the NWPA is a good policy choice;
the opinion emphasizes the damage this position does to congres-
sional power. 10 2
Perhaps the key textual point that undermined the DOE's argu-
ment for discretion, however, is the distinction between language in
97 See DOE Motion to Withdraw, supra note 83, at 6-7; see also U.S. Department of
Energy's Reply to the Responses to the Motion to Withdraw, U.S. Department of Energy
(High-Level Waste Repository), No. 63-001-HLW (A.S.L.B.P. May 27, 2010) (elaborating
on these central points).
98 See DOE Motion to Withdraw, supra note 83, at 2-3, 5.
99 See id. at 1-4, 7-8; id. at 4 ("Settled law... directs the NRC to defer to the judg-
ment of policymakers within the Executive Branch.").
100 See Memorandum and Order at 3, U.S. Dep't of Energy (High-Level Waste Reposi-
tory), No. 63-001-HLW (A.S.L.B.P. June 29, 2010) [hereinafter ASLBP Order]. The
ASLBP also granted the intervention petitions filed by the State of Washington, the State of
South Carolina, Aiken County, South Carolina, the Prairie Island Indian Community, and
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (as well as an amicus curiae
filing by the Florida Public Service Commission), concluding that each petitioner had es-
tablished standing. Id. at 2-3.
101 See id. at 5, 10 ("DOE contends that its conclusion that Yucca Mountain is not a
'workable option' and that 'alternatives will better serve the public interest' constitutes a
policy judgment with which the NRC should not interfere. Insofar as relevant, however,
the pertinent policy-that DOE's Yucca Mountain Application should be decided on the
merits by the NRC-is footed on controlling provisions of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act
that DOE lacks authority to override." (footnote omitted)).
102 See id. at 7-8 (discussing how Congress provided detailed steps in the NWPA and
stressing that under the NWPA the "ultimate authority" for choosing Yucca Mountain lay
not with the President but with Congress).
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the site characterization phase and the application phase of the
NWPA.10 3 While the former section permits the DOE to determine
Yucca Mountain to be "unsuitable," the latter section does not include
such language.10 4 Essentially, the ASLBP decision intimates that the
DOE missed its chance to make a policy-oriented judgment, rather
than a scientific conclusion, regarding the workability of Yucca Moun-
tain for development as a repository. This position is further sup-
ported by the ASLBP's evaluation of Congress's approval of Yucca
Mountain in 2002, when the legislative body "reinforced the expecta-
tion in the 1982 Act that the project would be removed from the polit-
ical process."10 5
C. The Aftermath
The ASLBP's June 29, 2010 decision threw a wrench into the
slowly grinding gears of the Administration's plan to disassemble
Yucca Mountain. Reactions came quickly on all fronts, but they were
laced with caution. 106 Even prior to the ASLBP decision, the interven-
ing petitioners 0 7 filed suit in the D.C. Circuit seeking to prevent the
DOE from withdrawing the license application and arguing that
under the NWPA it would be contrary to legislative will and in viola-
tion of statute to allow the Administration to abandon Yucca Moun-
tain. 10 8 The court initially stayed the proceeding until the ASLBP
issued a decision' 0 9 and then subsequently until the full vote by the
NRC.110
With the courts slogging through still more NWPA-related litiga-
tion, neither Congress nor the executive opted to wait patiently for a
verdict. Instead, just days after the ASLBP decision, approximately
ninety members of Congress drafted and signed a letter to the Secre-
tary of Energy requesting that the DOE cease its efforts to dismantle
Yucca Mountain pending resolution of litigation in the D.C. Cir-
103 See id. at 8-9.
104 See id. at 8; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 10133(c) (3), 10134 (2006).
105 See ASLBP Order, supra note 100, at 9 (considering legislative history and congres-
sional intent).
106 See Siobhan Hughes & Rebecca Smith, Panel Blocks Move to Scrap Yucca Site, WALL ST.
J., June 30, 2010, at A6 (discussing the reaction to the ASLBP decision by the nuclear
power industry and its allies, the DOE, and Nevada politicians).
107 The petitioners are Aiken County, Robert L. Ferguson, William Lampson, Gary
Petersen, the State of South Carolina, the State of Washington, and intervenor-petitioners
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. The four cases filed during the
spring of 2010 were consolidated under the name of the first case filed (In re Aiken Cnty.,
No. 10-1050 (D.C. Cir.)). See Brief of Petitioner at 3-4, In re Aiken Cnty., No. 1050 (D.C.
Cir. June 18, 2010).
108 See id. at 35-46.
109 See In re Aiken Cnty., No. 10-1050 (stayed by D.C. Circuit July 28, 2010).
110 See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
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cult.' 1 t The power of congressional oversight also provided a useful
tool for demanding that the DOE substantiate the reasons behind its
endeavors." 2 In a hearing held by the House Committee on the
Budget, questioning verged on hostile when members of Congress be-
came frustrated with the DOE Undersecretary's answers about why
Yucca Mountain was no longer an option' 13 and about what tempo-
rary storage measures were available given the delay in developing a
permanent repository. 14 During the hearing, committee members
also elicited information from the Undersecretary regarding the
DOE's intention to terminate all positions within its office handling
the Yucca Mountain licensing process by October 1, 2010, rendering
any subsequent contrary decision not necessarily futile, but certainly
ineffective in the short term.115
III Letter from 91 Members of the Congress of the United States to Secretary of En-
ergy Stephen Chu, United States Department of Energy (July 6, 2010), available at http://
murray.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f849572d-f3eb44f2-931 d-3aO I29eb32d5/Yucca
%20Letter.pdf (expressing disappointment that the DOE had "overstepped its bounds and
... ignored congressional intent").
112 See H.R. REP. No. 111-550, at 1 (2010) (requesting the President and directing the
Secretary of Energy to "provide certain documents to the House of Representatives relat-
ing to the Department of Energy's application to foreclose use of Yucca Mountain As a
high-level nuclear waste repository"), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
11 lhrpt550/html/CRPT-11 lhrpt550.htm.
113 See Hearing on Budget Implications, supra note 4, at 16 (statement of Rep. John M.
Spratt, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Budget). Chairman Spratt (D-S.C.) probed for an
answer as to what exactly makes Yucca Mountain "unworkable after all of these years and
all of this money spent." Representative Cynthia Lummis (R-Wyo.) attempted to force
DOE Undersecretary Kristina Johnson to commit to a position regarding the administra-
tion's decision. See id. at 25 (statement of Rep. Cynthia M. Lummis, Member, H. Comm.
on the Budget). Interestingly, Undersecretary Johnson resigned from the DOE less than
two months after this hearing. See George Lobsenz, Three Top Officials Leaving in DOE Man-
agement Exodus, THE ENERGY DAILY (Oct. 8, 2010), http://www.theenergydaily.com/publica-
tions/ed/Three-Top-Officials-Leaving-In-DOE-Management-Exodus_5164.html (reporting
that Secretary Steven Chu issued an internal memorandum on September 16, 2010 an-
nouncing Johnson's resignation).
114 See Hearing on Budget Implications, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of Rep. Betty Mc-
Collum, Member, H. Comm. on the Budget). Representative McCollum expressed her
opinion that one hundred to three hundred years is not "temporary" storage. Id. It is
interesting that the divide over Yucca Mountain is not expressed solely via political party
poles; instead, geography tends to play a more important role because politicians repre-
senting states that contain high quantities of spent nuclear fuel tend to be more active in
pushing for a permanent storage option. See Purchaser Fee Payments to the Nuclear Waste
Fund as of December 31, 2009, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/
edg/media/purchaser-fee-payments.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2011).
115 See Hearing on Budget Implications, supra note 4, at 22 (statement of Rep. Michael K.
Simpson, Member, H. Comm. on the Budget and KristinaJohnson, Undersecretary, Dep't
of Energy). In response to a question from Representative Simpson (R-Idaho) about
whether the DOE would "still have the personnel in place," Undersecretary Johnson re-
sponded: "[W]e believe that we have the right to withdraw the motion and to close down
Yucca Mountain. So, we have had to move and make sure that the employees can find
other positions. So, therefore, we will not have employees as of October 1, and we would
have to restart that process." Id. See also DEP'T OF ENERGY, FISCAL YEAR 2011 CONG, BUDGET
REQUEST: BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS 5, 8 (2010), available at http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/
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Unlike the outspoken congressional reaction, the executive re-
sponse has been one of deafening silence. Although discord mani-
fested itself among the NRC commissioners in early October after the
NRC directed its staff to handle the Yucca Mountain application in
congruence with the agency fiscal year 2011 budget request (which
contemplates the project's termination), 1 6 currently the NRC has
ceased reviewing the licensing application and failed to take definitive
final action on the ASLBP decision. 117 Recent developments indicate
that relations between the commissioners are strained, to put it
mildly. In October 2011, the NRC commissioners sent a letter to
White House Chief of Staff William L. Daley to express their "grave
concerns regarding the leadership and management practices exer-
cised by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Chairman Gregory
Jaczko."1 18 The House Committee on Oversight and Government Re-
form subsequently held a hearing in December 2011.119 Pursuant to
l l budget/Content/FY2011Highlights.pdf (affirming that the administration "has decided
to terminate the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management" in accord with its deci-
sion not to develop a repository at Yucca Mountain).
116 Commissioner Ostendorff disagreed with the NRC's guidance to its staff to direct
their handling of the Yucca Mountain application in congruence with the agency's fiscal
year 2011 budget request-which contemplates the project's termination. See Memoran-
dum from NRC Commissioner Ostendorff on Commission Direction on Staff Budget Gui-
dance Under Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 Continuing Resolution to Chairman Jaczko and
Commissioners Svinicki, Apostolakis, and Magwood (Oct. 6, 2010); Memorandum from
NRC Commissioner Ostendorff on Disagreement with Staff Budget Guidance Under Fiscal
Year 2011 Continuing Resolution to Chairman Jaczko and Commissioners Svinicki, Aposto-
lakis, and Magwood (Oct. 8, 2010), both available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-
collections/commission/comm-secy/2010/2010-0002comwco-redacted.pdf.
117 See sources cited infra notes 146-48; see also TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41675, CLOSING YUCCA MOUNTMN: LITIGATION ASSOCIATED WITH ATTEMPTS TO ABANDON
THE PLANNED NUCLEAR WASTE REPOSITORY 19-22 (2011), available at http://as-
sets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41675-20110304.pdf (speculating on the causes of NRC's delay
and future considerations in determining the fate of Yucca Mountain).
118 Letter from four commissioners of the Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n to White
House Chief of Staff William L. Daley (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://oversight.house.
gov/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id= 1535:issa-asks-white-house-to-testify-
at-hearing-on-nrc-respond-to-concerns-from-nuclear-regulatory-commissioners-that-chair-
man-jaczko-is-causing-serious-damage&catid=22:releasesstatements. The letter lists the
commissioners' grievances, including charges that Chairman Jaczko "created a high level
of fear and anxiety resulting in a chilled work environment" and "[i] nteracted with us, his
fellow Commissioners, with such intemperance and disrespect that the Commission no
longer functions as effectively as it should." Id.
119 For transcripts of the witness's statements at the hearing, see The Leadership of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & Gov.REFoRm (Dec. 14, 2011), http:/
/oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=1536%3A1 2-14-
2011-qthe-leadership-of-the-nuclear-regulatory-commissionq&catid=12&ltemid=20. Seealso
Matthew L. Wald, Leader of Nuclear Agency Hears Litany of Objections, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2011, at A30 (characterizing exchanges at the hearing as ranging from "merely testy to
caustic").
STANDING IN NUCLEAR WASTE
the NWPA, further action on Yucca Mountain cannot proceed without
NRC approval of the licensing application. 120
The nation is thus left at an impasse at a very difficult moment.
In the wake of the Japanese nuclear disaster, public support for nu-
clear power is even lower than it was following the Three Mile Island
partial core meltdown.' 21 Who has the power to break this standoff
and push the NRC to fulfill its statutory mandate? Two key legal issues
complicate this query. First, it is unclear whether litigation may pro-
ceed at all without final action by the NRC. Second, even if the first
hurdle is surmounted, it is uncertain that any court will grant standing
to petitioners who suffer generalized harm and seek to challenge the
NRC's failure to follow its mandate.
III
MODERN STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES
The chaotic history of the NWPA provides a unique opportunity
to examine the boundaries of the Supreme Court's prudential limita-
tion on petitioners claiming generalized grievances and to consider
broader questions on the application of modern standing doctrine in
cases involving independent agency action. Because of the Court's
reluctance to meddle in matters of executive and legislative preroga-
tive, the standard judicial response to petitioners who suffer uniform
harm is to seek relief through the political process. While this direc-
tive is proper in most cases, its viability relies on the capacity of the
political process to redress the asserted generalized harm. Since the
NRC is an independent agency divorced from the controls of the po-
litical process, the Court should recognize the inability of the electoral
system to provide adequate relief and accordingly, proffer a judicial
forum for redress.
A. Standing
The Court's standing doctrine is traditionally rooted in separa-
tion of powers principles. 122 Since Article IIIjudges are appointed for
120 See 42 U.S.C. § 10133 (2006).
121 See Michael Cooper & Dalia Sussman, Poll Shows Public is Losing Faith in Nuclear
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2011, at A15 (reporting that "[tihe unfolding crisis in Japan
occurred just as many Americans believed that nuclear power was poised to make a come-
back in the United States," and that now "nearly two-thirds of those polled said they were
concerned that a major nuclear accident might occur in this country-including 3 in 10
who said they were 'very concerned' by such a possibility").
122 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) ("[T]he law of Art. III standing is
built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers."). See generally Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L.
REv. 393, 472-77 (1996) (providing a brief overview of the Court's history shaping stand-
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life and not directly accountable to the people, the fear of errant judi-
cial meddling with the executive and legislative manifestation of ma-
jority will is of special concern. In response-and led by the Article III
requirement of a case or controversyt1 23-over time, the Court has rec-
ognized a constitutional core of standing prerequisites and developed
a set of self-imposed limitations. 124 Pursuant to the Court's constitu-
tional requirements, a petitioner must experience concrete injury125
that is fairly traceable to the challenged government action or inac-
tion 126 and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial deci-
sion. 127 Prudential controls prevent the Court from hearing both
claims that fall outside the zone of interests that the relevant statute is
intended to protect 28 and generalized grievances.1 29
ing doctrine with respect to separation of powers); Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 881 (1983)
("[T] he judicial doctrine of standing is a crucial and inseparable element of that [separa-
tion of powers] principle, whose disregard will inevitably produce.., an overjudicialization
of the processes of self-governance.").
123 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; Allen, 468 U.S. at 750 ("[T]he 'case or controversy'
requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of separation of powers
on which the Federal Government is founded.").
124 See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 122, at 885 (reviewing-but not endorsing-the Court's
division of standing into two layers: "prudential limitations of standing" and "core" consti-
tutional requirements).
125 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
126 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560-61).
127 Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (1984) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 41 (1976)).
128 See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) ("The
question of standing .... concerns, apart from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the question
whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone
of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.").
129 The Court has repeatedly held that it is insufficient to allege mere government
violation of the law. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 754 ("[A]n asserted right to have the Govern-
ment act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to conferjurisdiction on a
federal court."); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
220-21 (1974) (affirming that standing cannot be founded upon "an interest.., which is
held in common by all members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of
the injury all citizens share"). Although categorized as prudential here, Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Lujan reveals his intent to convert the judicial limitation on entertain-
ing generalized grievances into a constitutional restriction. See 504 U.S. at 575-78. Al-
though too simplistic an explanation for a very complex opinion, the primary justification
for this stance is founded in separation of powers ideology: when citizens are collectively
affected by government action they should turn not to the unelected judiciary for relief,
but to the political process. Justice Scalia's prior academic work offers additional insight:
"[T]he law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of
protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and excludes
them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two branches
should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself." Scalia, supra note 122, at
894. While Justice Scalia is not alone in his belief regarding the separation of powers and
the effect of allowing generalized grievances to be aired in court, numerous Justices have
expressed opposing views. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 522, 526 (holding that
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Traditionally, the Court does not allow petitioners who have gen-
eralized grievances to gain access to courts on this basis alone because
the political process is the more appropriate vehicle for citizens to
voice their collective dissent. However, rather than properly isolating
the Court from the political process, refusing access to courts in all
cases of widespread harm can actually undermine the constitutional
role assigned to the judiciary. On occasion, the executive operates
through an independent agency-such as the NRC-in implementing
executive will. Although the independent agency model has with-
stood a variety of attacks over the years since its creation, 30 these ad-
ministrative bodies are not held directly accountable via the political
process.13 1 Because agency officials are not elected and gaps exist in
the executive and legislative ability to supervise agency activity, resort-
ing to the political process is insufficient to assure accountability. 132
Thus, in the unusual (but now manifest) case of unruly independent
agency behavior, there is only one branch of the government remain-
ing to provide oversight: the judiciary.
B. Independent Agencies
.Although administrative agencies-independent or otherwise-
are often viewed as part of the executive branch, their technical place-
ment in the tripartite configuration is nebulous at best.1 33 This confu-
Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA's denial of its rulemaking petition be-
cause even though "climate-change risks are 'widely shared"' the state nonetheless exper-
ienced the risk of real harm); see also FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23-25 (1998)
(distinguishing between widely shared harm that is abstract, which is inappropriate to es-
tablish standing, and sufficiently concrete injury that is suffered by a large number of indi-
viduals, which is an appropriate basis for granting standing); see also Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at
238 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply
because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
Government actions could be questioned by nobody." (quoting United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
1-o See generally Charles N. Steele & Jeffrey H. Bowman, The Constitutionality of Indepen-
dent Regulatory Agencies Under the Necessary and Proper Clause: The Case of the Federal Election
Commission, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 363 (1987) (offering a defense of the independent agency
model grounded in the Necessary and Proper Clause and proper deference to the legisla-
tive branch).
131 I do not mean to suggest that independent agencies are in any way unconstitu-
tional. For a review of the judicial history approving of independent agencies, see id. at
365-68. Indeed, although this is a strong statement, I mean it in its most basic form:
agency officials are neither elected nor freely removable by elected authorities. See infra
Part III.B; see also Lloyd N. Cutler & David R.Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE LJ. 1395, 1399 (1975) (arguing that agencies "fail when they reach substantive policy
decisions.., that do not coincide with what the politically accountable branches of govern-
ment would have done").
132 See Cutler & Johnson, supra note 131, at 1402-06.
133 See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 773 (2002) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) ("Although Members of this Court have referred to agencies as a 'fourth
branch' of Government, FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing), the agencies, even 'independent' agencies, are more appropriately considered to be
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sion comes in part from the combination of functions present within
any given agency. For example, the NRC is responsible for devising
regulations applicable to the nuclear industry, issuing orders to licen-
sees, and adjudicating related matters. 134 The difficulty in catego-
rizing independent agencies is further compounded because none of
the three primary branches of government is bestowed with complete
control over agency activity. Indeed, although the executive and legis-
lative branches must authorize independent agency formation,
neither branch exerts complete control over their subsequent
operation.
Executive control is primarily a function of the President's Article
II power to appoint government officials (subject to the Senate's cor-
responding duty of confirmation) .135 However, the President has the
authority to appoint only the commissioners at the NRC, and the Sen-
ate opted to limit the President's ability to remove commissioners at
will.136 The President is able to maintain some oversight of NRC activ-
ity via the requirements of the regulatory planning process governed
by the Office of Management and Budget. 137 The legislature, too, re-
part of the Executive Branch." (citing Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 819 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))); see also Peter L. Strauss, The Place
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 573,
578-79 (1984) (arguing against a strict separation of powers classification of administrative
agencies, in favor of separation of functions flexibility and checks and balances principles).
134 See NRC: Organizations and Functions, U.S. NUCLEAuR RECGULATORY COMM'N, http:/
/www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/organization.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2011).
135 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law ... ". ).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (a) (5) (e) (2006) ("Any member of the Commission may be
removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.");
Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-32 (1935) (limiting the reach of the
holding in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), to at-will removal for purely executive
officers); see also Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (holding that the Presi-
dent does not have the power to remove "a member of an adjudicatory body" at will).
Scholars have extensively debated the removal problem in the literature; however, some
see this issue as missing the main point. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1231, 1244-45 (1994) (arguing that the Vesting
Clause in Article II makes the President's removal power "either constitutionally superflu-
ous or constitutionally inadequate"). For my purposes, discussing the inability of the Presi-
dent to remove Commissioners at will merely serves to show a gap in the overall structure
of executive supervision of independent agencies. When coupled with similar holes in
legislative and judicial oversight, this disconnect contributes to the risk of unfettered agen-
cies running roughshod over majority will.
137 Since President Bill Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 in September 1993, in-
dependent agencies are no longer exempt from this process. See Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2288 (2001) (discussing the "hints of an expansive
understanding of the President's authority over the sphere of administration" revealed by
Executive Order 12,866, but noting that independent agencies were spared from the most
dramatic change made by President Clinton-namely, that the President had the authority
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tains supervisory power over NRC activity; indeed, congressional com-
mittees can make agency officials very uncomfortable politically if so
desired.' 38 In addition, the legislative branch is responsible for draft-
ing the organic statute that determines agency organization and the
scope of its mandate. 139 Congress may also pass subsequent legisla-
tion that directly affects independent agencies, such as the NWPA.140
Of course, the legislative power is subject to an executive check: the
presidential veto.14 1
Despite these collective tools, neither the executive nor the legis-
lative branch retains complete control of independent agencies like
the NRC. There are important arguments for why this is a positive
and useful state of affairs. 142 The counter-argument, however, is that
independent agency commissioners are not directly subject to primary
government authority and as such are not responsive to the electorate.
Thus the question remains: how do we reconcile the value of indepen-
dence with the necessity of oversight?
IV
EXPANDED STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE ACTIONS OF
THE NRC
There is only one viable answer to this query: the judiciary. Al-
though the drafters of the Constitution may not have foreseen inde-
pendent agencies or the challenges of regulating the nuclear power
industry, they did anticipate the likelihood of evolving government
needs. The American tripartite model depends on balance and ac-
countability, and more importantly, on the three central branches to
ensure these ideals. Given the risks of excess power concentrated in
otherwise unchecked independent agencies, courts are the proper fo-
rums in which to seek review of the NRC's failure to pursue its objec-
tives under the NWPA. To facilitate its service in this capacity, the
to control executive branch agencies "in the exercise of their delegated rulemaking
power").
138 See supra notes 113-15 for an amusing example in which members of Congress
grilled representatives from the DOE over prospective plans regarding Yucca Mountain.
139 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5841-5852 (establishing the NRC).
140 Id. §§ 10101-10270.
141 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
142 Independent agencies often regulate highly technical fields (such as the nuclear
power industry) or politically sensitive matters (such as campaign financing for federal
elections). As a result, there are defensible reasons to sever these agencies from political
control. See, e.g., Steele & Bowman, supra note 130, at 370-72 (discussing the creation of
the Federal Election Commission and "Congress's belief that campaign finance laws could
not regulate the activities of the President's own reelection committee unless the execu-
tion of those laws was free from his direct control"); see also Cutler &Johnson, supra note
131, at 1402-04 (discussing the idea that agencies should be independent from political
forces in order to best serve the public interest and to allow regulators to develop stable
policies).
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Supreme Court should reaffirm recent precedent granting specialized
status to states and recognize the inapplicability of its prudential limi-
tation on entertaining claims of generalized harm brought by peti-
tioners in cases involving independent agency action.' 43
A. Granting Early Access
The Yucca Mountain litigation still unfolding in the D.C. Circuit
might indicate a move toward embracing this framework.144 The D.C.
Circuit initially stayed the In re Aiken County litigation to await final
agency action before proceeding, 145 but after more than five months
of silence by the NRC following the ASLBP decision, the court refused
to delay any further.146 Although the Commission retains final au-
thority over whether to accept the ASLBP decision,' 47 the NRC had
made no move to release the results of a vote that allegedly occurred
several months prior.' 48 Without issuing an opinion expressing its
143 Although challenges of this nature will often resemble impermissible generalized
grievances, the Court should look at the purpose underlying this limitation-namely, en-
couraging people to use the political process-rather than its superficial interpretation.
144 See In reAiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011), petition fora writ of manda-
musfiled, No. 11-1271, 2011 WL 3584396 (D.C. Cir.July 29, 2011). On appeal, the petition-
ers challenge both the DOE's authority to withdraw the licensing application from the
NRC under the NWPA and the executive determination to abandon Yucca Mountain.
145 The NWPA authorizes judicial review following "final decision or action of the...
Commission." 42 U.S.C. 10139(a) (1).
146 See Order Granting Motion to Lift Stay and Expedite Case, In re Aiken Cnty., No.
10-1050 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010) (per curiam).
147 See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM'N, UNITED
STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STAFF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DIGEST: COMMIS-
SION, APPEAL BOARD, AND LICENSING BOARD DECISIONS JULY 1972-AuGUST 2009, NUREG-
0386, Digest 16, § 4.3, at 8 (2010), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collec-
tions/nuregs/staff/sr0386/d16/sr0386d16.pdf ("[T]he Licensing Board will issue its ini-
tial decision .... [which] can conceivably constitute the ultimate agency decision on the
matter addressed in the hearing provided that it is not modified by subsequent Commis-
sion review.").
148 See Editorial, End the NRC Stalling on Yucca Mountain Decision, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov.
18, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorials/2013469370-editl9yucca.
html ("Four of the commissioners-a fifth recused himself - voted by Sept. 15, as they each
confirmed in recent letters to Sen. Jim Inhofe, R-Okla. Jaczko, who voted Aug. 26, said he
withdrew his vote and revoted Oct. 29-just days before his patron, former boss and fer-
vent opponent of Yucca Mountain, Sen. Harry Reid, barely fended off a tough Nov. 2
challenge."). The results of the vote over the ASLPB decision were finally released on
September 9, 2011. Unfortunately, this long-awaited determination merely raised addi-
tional issues because the Commissioners deadlocked, voting two against two. See Matthew
L. Wald, How Dead is Yucca Mountain?, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Sept. 12, 2011, 7:16 A.M.),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/ 20 1 1/09/12/how-dead-is-yucca-mountain/; see also Steve
Tetreault, NRC Urged to 'Clarify' Yucca Ruling, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL POLITICAL EYE
BLOC (Sept. 13, 2011, 8:28 A.M.), http://www.lvrj.com/blogs/politics/
NRC.urged-to-clarifyYucca.ruling.html (presenting the apparently contradictory dual
rulings from the NRC: on the one hand, the deadlock over whether the DOE could legally
withdraw the license application, and on the other hand, the decision to direct the ASLPB
to finish proceedings on Yucca Mountain by the end of the month).
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motivation, the D.C. Circuit scheduled a date for oral argument. 149
This is a step in the direction of more muscular judicial review. The
D.C. Circuit's refusal to indefinitely await the NRC decision shows the
court's unwillingness to defer to the independent agency's efforts to
resist review. This action may constitute an early move toward ac-
knowledging that independent agencies warrant stricter treatment in
light of their isolation from political accountability.
However, the significance of the D.C. Circuit's action may be less-
ened by subsequent proceedings. On July 1, 2011, the court dismissed
the claims presented by the petitioners in In re Aiken County for lack of
jurisdiction. 150 First, the court reasoned that the petitioners' claim
challenging the DOE's attempt to withdraw the license application
from the NRC was not ripe because the Commission's review of the
ASLBP ruling was ongoing.' 5 1 The court tempered this decision with
the caveat that "[v]ery soon . . . the contingencies discussed above
should be resolved" and additionally, that if the NRC failed to take
prompt action the petitioners would have a new cause of action: com-
pelling unreasonably delayed agency action. 152 Second, the court de-
termined that it did not have jurisdiction over the petitioners' claim
challenging the DOE's policy decision to abandon Yucca Mountain
since the petitioners could not point to any legally significant final
agency action. 5-
This ruling does not end the fight against Yucca Mountain.
Within a month, the petitioners filed in the D.C. Circuit seeking a writ
of mandamus to compel the NRC to conclude its review of the ASLBP
decision and, furthermore, to abide by the terms of the NWPA by fully
considering the DOE's license application for Yucca Mountain.1 54 On
September 9, 2011, the NRC finally disclosed the results of its vote
149 See Order Scheduling Oral Argument, In reAiken Cnty., No. 10-1082 (D.C. Cir.Jan.
10, 2011) (setting oral argument for March 22, 2011 after the December 10, 2010 order
lifted the stay and set a revised briefing schedule).
150 In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d 428, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
151 Id. at 434-36.
152 Id. at 436; see Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 72 (D.C. Cir.
1984) ("[W]here a statute commits final agency action to review by the Court of Appeals,
the appellate court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear suits seeking relief that might affect its
future statutory power of review.").
153 In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d at 436-37. The court found that petitioners were
"[u]nable to point to any unlawful action by the DOE," so they elected to challenge the
"DOE's public announcement regarding Yucca Mountain." Id. at 437. It further found
that "[n] either the NWPA nor the APA authorizes this type of legal attack." Id. The court
therefore held that the petitioners' "general complaints about the DOE's new policy re-
garding Yucca Mountain are simply not justiciable." Id.
154 See Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Agency Action Unreasonably Withheld), In re
Aiken Cnty., No. 11-1271, 2011 WL 3584396, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2011).
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over the ASLBP decision: two commissioners voted to uphold the rul-
ing and two commissioners voted to overturn it.155
B. Standing
Although the NRC's deadlock over the ASLBP decision compli-
cates the issues, a key question remains over which petitioners will
eventually secure standing to pursue the litigation. Currently, two
states (South Carolina and Washington), as well as three individuals,
are represented in the In re Aiken County litigation in the D.C. Cir-
cuit.156 But there are at least three classes of challengers likely to pre-
sent justiciable claims against the government arising out of the
NWPA: the private utility companies in contract with the government
under the NWPA, the states containing nuclear waste, and the re-
sidents of these states.' 57 Regardless of which petitioners ultimately
achieve standing, a second and perhaps more critical question re-
mains: which petitioners are in the best position to solicit a judicial
decision competent to reinstate the government's obligation to follow
through with Yucca Mountain?
1. Utility Companies
Under the NWPA, the nation's nuclear utility companies must
enter into Standard Contracts with the DOE in order to obtain re-
newal of their operating licenses. 158 This unusual arrangement be-
tween the utility companies and the DOE has resulted in an awkward
coupling. By intermingling the Standard Contract with the NWPA,
Congress effectively bound the parties together in a manner that has
had unforeseen and problematic consequences. First, although the
courts have firmly established government liability for damages owed
to the utility companies, they have also prohibited these damages
from being paid out of the Nuclear Waste Fund. 15 9 As a result, the
155 See sources cited supra note 148.
156 In re Aiken Cnty., 645 F.3d at 431.
157 Under the Administrative Procedure Act, petitioners have a right to judicial review
if they are "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a rele-
vant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). The NWPA authorizes the U.S. Courts of Appeals to
have exclusive jurisdiction for "review of any final decision or action of the Secretary, the
President, or the Commission under this part." 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a)(1)(A) (2006). There
is also a much broader fourth class of potential petitioners composed of tribal govern-
ments and local government entities. See, e.g., ASLBP Order, supra note 100, at 2-3 (grant-
ing petitions to intervene filed by the Prairie Island Indian Community and Aiken County,
South Carolina). The question of whether these petitioners should be granted standing is
beyond the scope of this Note due to the virtually unlimited possible members of the
fourth class.
158 See 42 U.S.C. § 10222; see also Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. United States, 422 F. 3d 1369,
1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing the Standard Contract).
159 See Ala. Power Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 307 F.3d 1300, 1316 (11th Cir. 2002)
(holding that "the Department of Energy is not authorized by law to spend NWF monies
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utility companies continue to pay fees into the Nuclear Waste Fund
while the government simultaneously doles out damages in the bil-
lions of dollars for its failure to accept nuclear waste on schedule.1 60
Second, thus far utility companies have brought litigation only on a
partial breach of contract theory because claiming total breach of con-
tract would have the effect of discharging the DOE from fulfilling its
statutory duties under the NWPA.161
While the utility companies may certainly continue their ongoing
pursuit of monetary damages for partial breach of contract in the
Court of Federal Claims-however much of a "legal fiction" these ac-
tions must rely on' 62-these petitioners may also be able to pursue a
claim for total breach of contract. Because the Standard Contract is
intertwined with the NWPA, this claim is equivalent to arguing that
the DOE and the NRC violated their statutory mandates under the
NWPA by causing the licensing application to remain unreviewed. Al-
though their contracts ensure the utility companies access to the
courts, a judicial remedy under their contracts would release the gov-
ernment from its obligation to dispose of nuclear waste-and leave
the utility companies stuck with it. Because this outcome is unlikely to
satisfy any of the parties involved, the utility companies are not in the
best position to seek redress for the current standstill of progress on
Yucca Mountain.
2. States
Perhaps a better class of candidates to argue for relief is the
states. No states have the unique status accorded to the utility compa-
nies as parties to the NWPA, but recent case law dictates that states
may be "entitled to special solicitude" with regard to standing.163 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court found that the EPA's refusal
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions resulted in a risk of concrete
harm to the petitioner-state, specifically, the loss of coastline due to
rising sea levels and global warming; that this harm was "widely
on settlement agreements aimed at compensating utilities for their on-site storage costs as
a result of the Department's massive breach").
160 See Hearing on Budget Implications, supra note 4, at 11-12 (statement of Michael F.
Hertz, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Civil Div., U.S. Dep't ofJustice) (stating that the govern-
ment had paid damages of approximately two billion dollars as of July 2010 and providing
the 2009 estimate of future liability at roughly thirteen billion dollars).
161 See, e.g., Ind. Mich. Power Co., 422 F.3d at 1374 ("The NWPA itself, and the Stan-
dard Contract's terms drafted pursuant to it, compelled Indiana Michigan to bring an
action for partial, not total, breach. Had Indiana Michigan brought an action for total
breach, DOE would have been discharged from further responsibility under the contract, a
situation apparently not desired by appellant and foreclosed by statute.").
162 See S. Cal. Edison Co. v. United States, 93 Fed. C1. 337, 342 (2010) (recognizing that
the courts "continue to operate under the legal fiction that there has only been a partial
breach" despite the reality of the situation).
163 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 521 (2007) (emphasis omitted).
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shared" did not defeat its validity.164 The Court lightened the tracea-
bility requirement by accepting that the EPA's inaction at least "con-
tribute[d]" to the petitioner-state's injuries.1 65 Likewise, although
action by the EPA would not fully prevent injury to Massachusetts, the
Court found Massachusetts' injuries sufficiently redressable because
the risks to the petitioner-state would be reduced if the Court issued a
favorable decision. 1 66
Despite vigorous dissent to the majority's decision, the rationale
underlying the opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA will likely assist states
seeking to challenge the actions of the NRC. The majority of states
have nuclear waste temporarily stored within their borders, 167 result-
ing in significant risks to the local population and environment. 168
This concrete injury is traceable to the government's failure to pro-
vide a permanent repository and it falls within the zone of interests
intended for protection by the NWPA169 A favorable decision would
not necessarily provide complete redress for the injuries experienced
by petitioner-states; however, based on the holding in Massachusetts v.
EPA, the redressability requirement may be satisfied despite the ab-
sence of a perfect solution. 170 A decision ordering the NRC to con-
tinue reviewing the licensing application qualifies because it is a step
toward lessening the risk to the petitioner-states posed by temporarily
stored nuclear waste.
Such a decision is likely to have significant ramifications. Specifi-
cally, the NRC would have to continue its review of the licensing appli-
cation unless Congress takes definitive action to amend or repeal the
NWPA. Ad hoc pronouncements, budgetary cuts, and administrative
agency stalling would no longer suffice to deter the pursuit of Yucca
Mountain. Moreover, the threat of increased judicial involvement
would likely ensure procedurally sound implementation of any subse-
164 See id. at 521-23.
165 See id. at 523-24.
166 See id. at 525-26 ("The risk of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless
real. That risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the relief they
seek.").
167 See Nuclear Energy Student Zone: Facing Challenges, supra note 1 (stating that nuclear
waste is stored at 125 sites in thirty-nine states).
168 See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Indian Point and a License to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/nyregion/15towns.html (describing concern
over the idea that two nuclear reactors at Indian Point would keep operating through 2033
and 2035, in part because of "the continuing leak of radioactive water into the Hudson");
Nicholas K. Geranios, Radioactive-Waste Leak at Hanford Worst in Years, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug.
1, 2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003816157_webhanfordleak
01.html (reporting an estimated fifty to one hundred gallons of leaked radioactive waste at
the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Washington state).
169 See 42 U.S.C. § 10131(a)(7) (2006) (seeking to protect the "public health and
safety and the environment" from radioactive waste and spent fuel).
170 See supra notes 129, 163-66 and accompanying text.
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quent decisions. Finally, validating the petitioner-states' challenge to
the federal handling of the NWPA would almost certainly instigate
new debate over energy policy and the status of radioactive waste man-
agement in the United States.
3. Individual Residents
The Court's apparent willingness to apply its standing doctrine
flexibly in light of unusual circumstances-such as those in Massachu-
setts v. EPA-also offers hope for individual petitioners seeking to
challenge the NRC's action. People living in the near vicinity of tem-
porarily stored nuclear waste will likely want to challenge the decision
to abandon almost thirty years of work spent developing Yucca Moun-
tain as the nation's nuclear waste repository. Even though potential
harm from stored nuclear waste is difficult to predict with any cer-
tainty, there is precedent that a person's injury is "actual or imminent"
when he merely lives near a site designated for nuclear waste storage if
insufficient safety standards are imposed. 171 Such arguments have
gained greater currency in the wake of the Japanese nuclear disaster.
That this injury may be widely shared does not mitigate its legitimacy.
The traceability requirement is slightly more difficult to satisfy
but should not be prohibitive. While individual petitioners are not
members of the regulated community, they are intended beneficiaries
and their injuries fall within the zone of interests the NWPA is de-
signed to protect.172 The causal link between the harm incurred from
temporarily stored nuclear waste and the actions of the federal gov-
ernment is clear. Utility companies continue storing spent fuel on site
because the government has not opened a permanent repository and
accepted transfer of the radioactive material. The intermediate step is
the failure of the NRC to complete its review of the DOE's licensing
application for Yucca Mountain pursuant to the NWPA. Without NRC
review, Yucca Mountain cannot be constructed and, given the lack of a
viable alternative, nuclear waste will stay put.
Even if the Court were to order the NRC to continue reviewing
the licensing application, it is uncertain whether the agency would
reach a decision favorable to the petitioners. Though this outcome
171 SeeNuclear Energy Inst., Inc. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1266, 1271-73 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(finding that the EPA's ten-thousand-year "compliance period" was insufficient pursuant to
statute, and that the individual's injury was "'actual or imminent,' for he lives adjacent to
the land where the Government plans to bury 70,000 metric tons of radioactive waste-a
sufficient harm in and of itself").
172 In the findings section of the NWPA, Congress determined that nuclear waste and
spent fuel were "major subjects of public concern," and that precautions must be taken to
protect the "public health and safety and the environment for this or future generations."
See 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (a) (7). Accordingly, one of the purposes of the NWPA is to establish
the responsibility of the federal government to dispose of radioactive waste. See id.
§ 10131 (b) (2).
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may satisfy standing requirements for petitioner-states, it is unlikely
the Court will view it as sufficient for individual petitioners who do not
share the state's quasi-sovereign interests. The redressability require-
ment is therefore problematic. One solution to this difficulty is to
reframe the injury such that an order to the NRC would redress the
relevant harm. This becomes possible if the injury is actually the harm
experienced by petitioners because the NRC did not follow its man-
date under the NWPA. This injury results from citizens' damaged ex-
pectation that their government will follow the law. However, the
Court has traditionally refused to grant standing on the basis of such
generalized grievances in favor of directing people to the political
process. And here is where the conundrum arises: because the NRC is
not directly responsive to the political process, 7 3 there is no recourse
for the injured citizen if the Court prohibits individual petitioners
from accessing the judiciary.
The petitioners here will suffer particularized substantive harm
(the risks associated with temporarily stored nuclear waste) as a result
of their generalized grievance (the failure of the NRC to follow its
mandate under the NWPA). The Court cannot provide redress for
the former harm without first curing the latter injury. To grant stand-
ing in this context does not require great divergence from current
doctrine; there is precedent stating that a person with a procedural
right to protect his substantive interests does not need to satisfy "all
the normal standards for redressability and immediacy. ' 174 The only
additional step is to recognize the petitioners' generalized grievance
as a valid procedural injury that-accompanied by substantive harm-
may be used to access the Court.
While this complicated route to the courthouse is a feasible
means of seeking redress, it is not the best solution. Individual per-
sons should be able to get standing to challenge the government's
disregard of the NWPA because of the harm this action may inflict,
but the states are in a considerably better position to attain effective
173 See supra Part III.B.
174 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). Consider further how
Justice Scalia's illustration of how "procedural rights" are distinct in his majority opinion in
Lujan: "The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability
and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to the site for proposed
construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing agency's
failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish
with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and
even though the dam will not be completed for many years." Id. This example directly
incorporates the view that a petitioner may offer his procedural injury for redress by the
Court in order to cure the underlying substantive harm. The procedural right here flows
from provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006), and the
NWPA, 42 U.S.C. § 10139(a) (1) (A).
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relief. Because courts will by necessity need to reframe individual pe-
titioners' injuries as procedural in nature, a favorable decision techni-
cally only speaks to the harm inflicted by the NRC's failure to follow
its mandate. In the case of the petitioner-states, the precedent set by
Massachusetts v. EPA opens the door for the risks posed by nuclear
waste temporarily stored within state lines to qualify as the relevant
injury. This distinction is critical. A favorable decision for a peti-
tioner-state will redress the injury of temporarily stored nuclear waste,
while the same result for a petitioner-individual can merely validate
the person's right to hold the government accountable through the
courts when the political process does not suffice. Only the former
outcome is likely to have any discernible impact on nuclear waste
management in this country.
CONCLUSION
The clock is ticking on the problem of nuclear waste disposal.
The majority of nuclear power plants in this country have already fil-
led their maximum storage space for radioactive waste and within ten
years, nearly every plant will reach capacity.175 The dangers of contin-
uing on-site storage include exposing the public to tanks that leak ra-
dioactive material, providing visible targets for terrorist attacks, and,
as occurred in Japan, opening the door for natural disasters to esca-
late into national devastation. It took over ten billion dollars and
close to thirty years to near readiness to build Yucca Mountain; this
country has neither the resources nor the time to start from scratch.
The judiciary has a crucial role to play in ensuring the safe and perma-
nent storage of nuclear waste.
175 See Kirkham, supra note 3; see also Status of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, supra note 8.
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Erratum
Due to a production error in Volume 97 Issue 2, the tides of Figures
7- 9 on pages 288-90 were incorrectly printed. They should read the
following:
FIGURE 7.
EXPERIMENT 3: MEAN RATINGS OF SARA DAVIDSON'S
OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DEATH OF THE Boy,
By MORAL CHARACTER AND AWARENESS
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
FIGURE 8.
EXPERIMENT 3: EXTENT TO WHICH SARA DAVIDSON WAS
PERCEIVED TO HAVE CAUSED THE BOY'S DEATH
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
FIGURE 9.
EXPERIMENT 3: EXTENT TO WHICH SARA DAVIDSON WAS PERCEIVED
To HAVE ACTED INTENTIONALLY TOWARD THE Boy's DEATH
(1 = not at all; 7 = very much).
We apologize for the error and any inconvenience or confusion this
has caused.
Joe Christensen, Inc.

